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Abstract
Transport sector is in the process of being rapidly and fundamentally reshaped by au-
tonomous and collaborative driving technologies. This reshaping promises huge economic
and social benefits and brings equally huge challenges in terms of developing and deploy-
ing secure, safe vehicles and transportations systems, their smooth integration to social
fabric and related adaptation of legal and regulatory framework within dynamic ecosys-
tem. We have employed Policy Scan and Technology Strategy Design methodology [18] in
order to identify concrete societal expectations and problems and map them with mitigat-
ing technological availabilities in the domain of autonomous driving and smart mobility.
The identified technology, having a clear place in emerging technological and regulatory
landscape as well as market deployment potential is Event Data Recorder for Autonomous
Driving (EDR/AD). Work on concrete junction between social problems and technology
availabilities in terms of EDR/AD, presented in this article, is a continuation of the pre-
vious article on Policy Scan and Technology Strategy Design methodology [18], which are
results of the same research project.
EDR/AD is an envisioned subsystem of a vehicular Controller Area Network which
ensures the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data related to operation of a ve-
hicle in order to permit recovery of exact situation following the occurrence of an event
or on demand. The exact technical and regulatory requirements for the device are still
in the development internationally, but it is already clear that it will be included into
vehicle type-approval requirements at UNECE level. This paper presents the analysis of
the context of the usage of the EDR/AD in collaborative intelligent transport systems,
related security, data provenance and privacy, other regulatory and technical issues tak-
ing into account many interest groups and stakeholders involved. We present a concrete
proposal for developing a EDR/AD proof of the concept prototype with clear market de-
ployment potential and urge security researchers, vehicle manufacturers, and component
suppliers to form a collaboration towards implementing important technology for making
future autonomous vehicles within C-ITS more socially acceptable and legally compliant.
Furthermore, EDR/AD technology, apart from its immediate use in autonomous driving
and smart mobility domain has a potential to be extended to general autonomous robot
and AI applications.
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1 Introduction
One of the fastest developing areas in the domain of autonomous robotics and artificial intelli-
gence (AI) with a potential for a large scale deployment in short or medium term is self-driving
technologies and smart mobility systems based on them. The already started transition of con-
ventional transport systems and infrastructure to collaborative intelligent transportation sys-
tems based on self-driving technologies, ubiquitous connectivity and traffic management with
minimal human intervention promises the first integration of advanced AI into social life of such
magnitude. Given many uncertainties inherent not only in technology developments but also
in user acceptance, societal expectations and problems, changes needed to legal and regulatory
systems and many more, it is instrumental for the success of the transition to ensure that the
societal expectations and policies are embedded early in the technology development process.
For addressing the challenge of integrating the "application pull" determined by social needs,
expectations and problems with the "technology push" originating from the accelerating develop-
ment of technologies and specific solutions, we have developed the Policy Scan and Technology
Strategy Design methodology. The methodology is conceived for identifying and negotiating
concrete societal problems and technological solutions that mitigate them by facilitating a di-
alog between social world and the world of technological availabilities in immediate contexts
and situations. For the in-depth presentation and discussion of the Policy Scan and Technology
Strategy Design methodology see [18], which is a predecessor to the current article and is based
on the results of the same research project.
In a nutshell, the method described in [18] is a design inquiry encompassing three stages
which are iteratively visited many times until concrete societal problem and a technological
solution mitigating it are identified and negotiated between involved parties. These stages
are: (1) Content analysis (of document and interviews), (2) Identifying / correcting directions
of inquiry, (3) Modeling the solution. The goal of the methodology is to provide a systemic
approach to consolidate huge informational context into socially acceptable and sustainable
innovation road-map for both companies and governments.
The current paper describes the outcome of the Policy Scan and Strategy Design process
in a chosen application domain of autonomous driving and smart mobility – which resulted
in identification of in-vehicle data recording, storage and access management technology. The
identified technology is a concrete junction point between the world of current societal problems
and expectations in the domain and the technology world providing availabilities to mitigate
these problems.
As discussed in [18], European Union is among the most progressive governments which
start to draft proposals of how to approach legal, regulatory and governance aspects related to
the introduction of advanced autonomous robots and AI technologies into society (considering,
among other aspects, disruption of the job market, ethical issues and the possibility that in the
long term AIs will surpass human intellectual capacity). One of the ways to integrate AI to
society is to pave a way for understanding independent decisions of AI through equipping all
autonomous robots with a "black box" enabling recording, storing and analyzing their internal
operations, logic and decisions1. In case of autonomous vehicles, this requirement relates closely
to the upcoming legislation requiring to upgrade the Event Data Recording devices (which are
currently being installed in most cars) accommodating them to much richer and technically
challenging automated driving context. Such devices would help reconstructing traffic events,
understand causes of behavior of autonomous cars and autonomous traffic managers, solve legal,
1I.e. implementing transparency principle proposed by European Parliament [12]
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insurance and technical issues. Yet it also implies collecting, storing and sharing huge amounts
of data at least part of which is highly privacy sensitive and regulated by international and EU
data privacy and provenance laws.
In-vehicle data recording, storage and access management is a close to the market technolog-
ical innovation witch addresses important legal challenges inherent in implementing intelligent
transportation systems. Apart from the immediate function, this technology provides a step-
ping stone towards implementation of transparency principle of autonomous robots and AI in
the long term. Last but not least, development and implementation of in-vehicle data record-
ing, storage and access management systems is a business opportunity for entering dynamic and
quickly growing market.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we explain major developments of au-
tonomous driving industry, relevant governance bodies and legislative domains. The section
introduces relations between social and technology worlds in the autonomous driving and smart
mobility domain. Section 3 addresses the legislative and technological developments, the debate
of industry stakeholders around the in-vehicle data access solutions and their place in collabo-
rative intelligent transportation systems (C-ITS). Subsection 3.3 presents in-depth analysis of a
proposed concrete technological solution for solving specific societal problem having clear mar-
ket deployment potential – Event Data Recorder for Autonomous Driving (EDR-AD). Section
4 concludes the article and outlines further work.
2 Autonomous driving technology and market develop-
ment
Technology developers, policy makers and transportation system regulators compete by propos-
ing, experimenting and developing different visions, technical and regulatory approaches to the
products and services based on self-driving technologies and their introduction into society and
existing transportation infrastructures. Notwithstanding the huge developmental potential and
projected social and economic benefits, self driving is only one, albeit important, technology
which is disruptively changing global transportation systems. Other emerging technologies at
different maturity levels are electrical power trains2, distributed fleet management3 and naviga-
tion4, high speed vacuum tube trains5, long distance underground tunnel networks6, collabora-
tive intelligent transportation systems7 and drive sharing schemes8. Autonomous driving is an
exemplar of AI technology, application of which is not exclusively related to passenger vehicles
but developed with relation to all transport modalities – trucks9, rail10, marine vessels11 and
autonomous flying vehicles12. The rich and dynamic ecosystem of technological solutions direct
and accelerate the development of vertically integrated technologies related to different hard-
2e.g. Tesla – https://www.tesla.com/
3e.g. Uber – https://www.uber.com/en-BE/
4e.g. Waze – https://www.waze.com/
5e.g. Virgin Hyperloop One – https://hyperloop-one.com/
6e.g. The Boring Company – https://www.boringcompany.com/
7e.g. European C-ITS project – https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/its/c-its_en
8e.g. DriveNow – https://www.drive-now.com/be/en/for-businesses
9e.g. Uber (former Otto) – https://www.uber.com/info/atg/truck/
10https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_automated_urban_metro_subway_systems
11e.g. Rolls-Royce’s Advanced Autonomous Waterborne Applications Initiative – http://www.rolls-
royce.com/media/press-releases/yr-2016/21-06-2016-rr-publishes-vision-of-the-future-of-remote-and-
autonomous-shipping.aspx
12e.g. Vahana – https://vahana.aero/
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ware sensors, high speed data transfer networks, including new mobile networks, digital, security,
software, machine learning and AI technologies – just to name a few. These technologies and
solutions dynamically interact towards creating completely new industries and transforming ex-
isting ones which cannot successfully operate without adapting legal frameworks and governance
practices at almost all levels of governance.
Many technologies, notably collaborative intelligent transportation systems cannot even be
started to be developed and deployed without large scale collaborations and partnerships among
infrastructure providers, policy makers and private companies. It is a considerable challenge to
steer the development of highly dynamic ecosystem of technological availabilities considering
the societal need for clear rules of the game in terms of legislation and standardization, which
nevertheless do not stifle often unpredictable innovations.
In the area of autonomous driving and smart mobility market development, one can dis-
tinguish two trends which on the one hand compete in terms of technology availabilities and
governance models, on the other – are trying to adapt to each other: (1) technologies aimed
at replacing human drivers and making vehicles able to independently operate within current
transport infrastructure (Subsection 2.1) and (2) technologies aimed at interaction and collab-
oration of individual autonomous or semi-autonomous vehicles and by that making the whole
transportation system or some of its aspects considerably more efficient and safe (Subsection
2.2).
2.1 Individual autonomous vehicles
First truly autonomous vehicles appeared in 1980s in the form of research projects by major uni-
versities and car manufacturers. In 1990s and 2000s large scale research projects in Europe and
US have demonstrated self-driving cars that were able to travel thousands of kilometers in mixed
traffic conditions on public roads essentially performing all driving functions. 2010s marked the
accelerating commercial interest in autonomous driving technologies, with major companies
(first technology companies and then established vehicle manufacturers) starting projects for
developing prototypes of autonomous or semi-autonomous vehicles with clear market deploy-
ment prospects. As of 2018, all major car manufacturers as well as some technology companies
have an autonomous vehicle in development and(or) already sell cars with limited self-driving
capabilities (e.g. park-assist, lane change functionality, etc.). At the same time, governments,
cities and traffic authorities have realized both the potential offered by the integration of self-
driving technologies into transport infrastructure and public transportation systems as well as
related legal, regulatory and infrastructural challenges. Currently, major regulatory initiatives
for adapting traffic rules, international agreements, product and civil liability rules and more
are well under way at the level of United Nations, European Union, European member states,
US federal, state levels and other countries [18].
In 2016, the International Society of Automotive Engineers proposed a taxonomy of six
vehicle automation levels [8] which became a de facto standard for the industry (see Figure 1a).
Level 0 refers to no automation at all, while Level 5 – to full automation without a need for
a driver in any driving conditions. Most currently produced and marketed cars feature partial
automation of Level 2. It is expected that automated vehicles of SAE levels 3-4, which allow
driver to perform secondary tasks for a limited number of driving scenarios, should be available
in the market by 2020 (see Figure 1) and fully autonomous door-to-door vehicles for any driving
conditions (SAE Level 5) are expected to be available by 2030 [1, p. 4].
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(a) Different levels of automation by Society of automotive
engineers (adapted from [6, p. 42])
(b) Timeline of AV adoption by Policy Networka (adapted
from [16, p. 7])
aPolicy Network, UK
Figure 1: SAE automation levels and estimation of the timeline of AV adoption. Note, that the
time-line is very difficult to estimate given the level of unpredictability and fast pace of technological
change.
2.2 Collaborative intelligent transportation systems
Collaborative intelligent transport system (C-ITS) is a peer-to-peer solution for the exchange
of data among vehicles and other road infrastructural facilities (traffic signs, traffic controllers,
other transmitting/receiving base stations or smart city sensors) without the intervention of
network operator (see Figure 2). European Commission has adopted and is enforcing a large scale
strategy for supporting the development of EU framework for more connectivity, cooperation
and automation to address challenges and reap benefits on mobility in Europe. Various studies
have revealed that the potential benefits of automated driving can reach up to e71bn in 2030
[6, p. 42]. While it is acknowledged that the potential economic and social benefits of the
technological disruption are huge, they are not automatic – the guidance and governance of the
transition will have a decisive role on the ability to harness them.
The start of large scale deployment of collaborative intelligent transport system is targeted
for the year 2019 in European Union. To that end, the European Commission is supporting large
scale cross-border trials of automated vehicles based on smart-highway infrastructure, supports
C-ITS deployment, fosters collaboration between telecoms and automotive industries, and more.
It is clearly acknowledged that the first deployment of C-ITS in 2019 will cover only limited so
called ’first day use cases’ identified by the Commission, yet the infrastructure has to allow for
gradual (but rather fast) scaling-up to advanced use cases and scenarios.
2.3 Relevant governance bodies
The organizational structures and governance bodies which collectively shape the EU framework
for connectivity, cooperation and automation of mobility sector are:
C-ITS Platform. The Platform for the Deployment of Cooperative Intelligent Transport Sys-
tems in the European Union was launched in the second half of 2014 with the intention to
support the emergence of a common vision, provide and operational instrument for dialog,
exchange of knowledge and cooperation on technical, legal, organizational, administrative
and governance aspects [14, p. 20]. The platform represents all the major stakeholders
5
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Figure 2: C-ITS illustration: The beacon message is known as a CAM (Cooperative Awareness
Message – shown in yellow) broadcasts position, direction of a vehicle, its speed, and other data and
forms the backbone of the analysis done by the ITS Stations in range. The result of CAM analysis and
sensor data is used to detect events. If an event is detected, a DENM (Decentralized Environmental
Notification Message) is sent. It specifies the event, its time and its location. Both CAM and DENM
have a range of several hundred meters and can be instantly received by all ITS Stations in range. C-ITS
is a radio system, the sender has no relationship with the recipients of the messages. The messages
are pseudonymised, meaning that frequently changing security certificates will veil the identity of the
sender [15, p. 12].
of C-ITS and is comprised of nine working groups which provide outcomes in terms of
technical and legal framework necessary for the deployment of C-ITS as well as needs and
possibilities of higher levels of automation – towards what is called Connected, Cooperative
and Automated Mobility (CCAM) [14, p. 8].
High Level Group on Automotive Industry ’GEAR 2030’ was launched by the Euro-
pean Commission in October 2015 in order to develop a coordinated and effective EU
approach for the automotive industry at its turning point which is characterized by the
need to embrace the upcoming digital revolution, automated and connected driving, envi-
ronmental challenges, societal changes and globalization [6, p. 5].
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) houses the Global Forum
for Road Traffic Safety (Working Party 1)13, World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle
Regulations (Working Party 29)14 and also regulates uniform provisions concerning the
approval of vehicles with regard to steering equipment (UN Regulation 79)15. The type
approval and road worthiness rules applicable in EU are developed by these bodies.
Specifically, Working Party 29 (WP.29)16 is a worldwide regulatory forum which pro-
vides the legal framework allowing member countries to establish regulatory instruments
concerning motor vehicles and equipment. The framework developed by WP.29 allows
the market introduction of innovative vehicle technologies, while continuously improving
global vehicle safety via defining performance test and administrative requirements and
procedures, type approvals, the conformity of production, periodic technical inspections
13http://www.unece.org/trans/main/welcwp1.html
14https://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/meeting_docs_wp29.html
15https://wiki.unece.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=25265606
16https://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/introduction.html
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and more.
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 17 deals with data protection issues for Euro-
pean Commission and Council and is comprised out of representatives of data protection
supervisory authorities of each member country, representatives of relevant EU institutions
and European Commission.
European Standards Organization (ETSI) - a regional standards body dealing with telecom-
munications, broadcasting and other electronic communication networks and services. The
EU explicitly recognizes the standartization procedures of ETSI as technically thorough,
inclusive and permits to draft European Standards, EN standards and lends them their
legitimacy [15, p. 7].
ISO Technical Committee (TC) 204 "is responsible for the overall system aspects and in-
frastructure aspects of intelligent transport systems (ITS), as well as the coordination of
the overall ISO work programme in this field including the schedule for standards devel-
opment, taking into account the work of existing international standardization bodies"18;
European Committee for Standardization (CEN) 19 is officially recognized by EU as Eu-
ropean standards (ENs) body and is developing ENs for building European (Digital) Single
Market. CEN Technical Committee 27820 is developing all standards related to Intelligent
Transport Systems in Europe;
SAE International (initially established as Society of Automotive Engineers)21 is professional
organization and standards developing body based in US with principal emphasis on trans-
port industries.
Discussions of industry stakeholders and policy makers within these bodies shape the collec-
tive decisions and eventual legislation of collaborative intelligent systems and automated driving
in Europe and internationally. By considering all aspects of the industry transition, the emerging
regulatory framework touches and in part guides specific technological solutions. Implications
of the framework to the in-vehicle data recording, storage and access management technology
are discussed in Section 3.3.
2.4 Relevant legislative domains
The five large legislative domains which are related to the future smart mobility solutions and
connected and autonomous driving technologies as they will be deployed in European market
are:
Product liability framework is implemented by Product Liability Directive in EU. The di-
rective lays down common rules for the liability without fault of the producer for damage
caused by a defective product. The aim of the directive is to facilitate the free movement
of goods while ensuring an equal level of protection for consumers. Autonomous robots in
general and self-driving cars in particular, due to their ability to learn and actuate new
behaviors, make it difficult to trace liability to owner, user or manufacturer in case of an
17http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=605262
18https://www.iso.org/committee/54706.html
19https://www.cen.eu/Pages/default.aspx
20https://standards.cen.eu/dyn/www/f?p=204:7:0::::FSP_ORG_ID:6259&cs=1EA16FFFE1883E02CD366E9E7EADFA6F7
21https://www.sae.org/
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accident or inappropriate behavior. Although the proposals how to deal with this challenge
vary from suggestions for establishing electronic personality for autonomous robots [12, p.
16] to applying the current framework without change, the current opinion of experts is
that product liability framework need not change in the nearest future22.
Type approval framework is implemented by Type Approval Rules in EU which are devel-
oped by UNECE. Type approval describes the process applied by national authorities to
certify that a model of a vehicle meets all EU safety, environmental and conformity of
production requirements before authorizing it to be placed on the EU market. Type ap-
proval rules as well as certification procedures will definitely need to be adapted for the
autonomous cars and autonomous robots as well as their infrastructure – a process that
is still well under way.
Data Privacy and Provenance Policy is a part of the initiative of building a European data
economy23 which is in turn a part of European Digital Market Strategy and is implemented
by two legislative documents: General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)24 and Regu-
lation on Privacy and Electronic Communications (e-Privacy Regulation)25, both of which
are set to be put into force on 25 May 2018. GDPR provides legal protection of personal
data of natural persons and applies to all companies or organizations collecting and/or
processing personal data of data subjects residing in EU. Apart from the serious penalties
which will be imposed on companies failing to comply with the regulation, it establishes
rules for collecting explicit consent of data subjects to process their data, breach notifica-
tions, right to access (information and procedures about personal data being processed) by
data subjects, right to be forgotten (i.e. erased from the personal data and cease its further
dissemination), data portability (i.e. ability to transparently change company or organi-
zation which processes the personal data) and privacy by design. E-Privacy Regulation
augments GDPR by dealing with protecting private data in electronic communications
(including machine-generated data and machine-to-machine communications) in terms of
enhancing security and confidentiality, defining clearer rules of tracking technologies, ad-
dressing fragmentation of legislation in the domain as well as consistent enforcement with
agreement to GDPR.
Free flow of data framework is also a part of European data economy initiative and is im-
plemented by the Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on a framework
for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union (free flow of data regula-
tion)26. The regulation defines rules for storage and processing of non-personal data across
the European Union including machine generated data and together with Data Privacy
and Provenance Policy cover all production, storage and communication of all types of
data. An important note is in place here: despite the impression of structure that the
adopted and proposed legislation for data governance provides, there is great uncertainty
about how exactly it will play out when exposed to the real world situations and cases.
For example, whether specific data is ’personal’, ’sensitive’ or ’non-personal’ (and therefore
which regulation is applicable) is very much context dependent – especially considering
quickly developing machine learning and so called Big Data analysis techniques which
22See proceedings of the Workshop on liability in the area of autonomous systems and advanced robots and
Internet of Things systems (at European Parliament)
23https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/building-european-data-economy
24http://www.eugdpr.org/
25http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-connected-digital-single-market/file-e-privacy-
reform
26http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-connected-digital-single-market/file-free-flow-of-
data
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allow to identify person from mining seemingly ’non-personal’ data. Therefore the ap-
propriate way to approach the regulatory structure of European data economy is treat it
as guidelines and framework of cooperation between involved stakeholders (policy mak-
ers, businesses and data subjects) rather than strictly established and clear rules to be
followed.
C-ITS Certificate and Security Policy aims to define a trust model in Europe to ensure
secure and interoperable exchange of C-ITS messages on EU-wide level. The model is
being developed by the Working Group Security of C-ITS Platform which has released the
first agreed upon by all involved stakeholders document in June 201727. The document
defines the European C-ITS trust model based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) as
well as details on the roles and processes of how security certificates are issued including
schemes for ensuring pseudonymity via authorization tickets. Importantly, data access and
provenance solutions will have to be integrated with the PKI trust model being developed.
Despite the breath and scope of these legislative domains, they directly influence the in-
vehicle data recording, storage and access management technology which we discuss further.
3 In-vehicle data access
Deployment of autonomous and collaborative driving technologies will generate unprecedented
amounts of data flows, management of which will strongly influence operational efficiency, se-
curity and overall socio-economic benefits of the system as well as smoothness of the transition.
The higher the automation of a vehicle, the more important are data flows among internal
components to their function and operation – presenting considerable technical, regulatory, se-
curity and safety challenges. Collaborative intelligent transport (C-ITS) system, where data is
being exchanged between vehicles and can influence their decisions, adds yet another layer of
complexity to the already challenging problematics.
Access to in-vehicle data has a specific position within the C-ITS platform, since its scope is
beyond purely C-ITS and includes existing and possible future in-vehicle applications or services.
Certain parts of data will have to be stored for prolonged periods of time and/or made available
not only to competent authorities, but also for other parties of C-ITS system (car manufactur-
ers, users, operators, service providers, etc.), especially beyond first deployment of the system.
Besides security, data privacy and provenance issues will become relevant as long as in-vehicle
storage will be accessible and potentially copy-able for third parties. Personal data should be
appropriately secured, including protection against unauthorized processing and against dis-
closure, accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical and organizational
measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’) [15, p. 18].
In this section we discuss these challenges in detail and introduce and explain Event Data
Recorder for Automated Driving (EDR-AD) – the proposed technical solution for mitigating
concrete (albeit of course not all) challenges of integrating automated driving technologies into
society. See the predecessor of the current article [18] for the explanation of Policy Scan and
Technology Strategy design process that led to targeting in-vehicle data storage domain and
identification of the EDR/AD solution as the best candidate for short/medium term market
deployment.
27https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf
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3.1 In-vehicle data recording, storage and access management require-
ments
Security and safety of autonomous vehicles and collaborative intelligent transportation systems
is a strict overarching requirement for their market deployment and is a formidable technological
and governance challenge. Real-time in-vehicle data recording, storage and access management
is instrumental for reconstructing traffic events and understanding what caused them, also for
continuous improvement of technology. Five guiding principles should be applied when granting
access to the in-vehicle data resources[2]:
Data provision conditions: consent. The data subject (owner of the vehicle and/or through
the use of the vehicle or nomadic devices) decides if data can be provided and to whom,
including the concrete purpose for the use of the data (and hence for the identified service).
There is always an opt-out option for end customers and data subjects. This is without
prejudice to requirements of regulatory applications.
Fair and undistorted competition. Subject to prior consent of the data subject, all service
providers should be in an equal, fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory position to offer
services to the data subject.
Data privacy and data protection. There is a need for the data subject to have its vehi-
cle and movement data protected for privacy reasons, and in the case of companies, for
competition and/or security reasons.
Tamper-proof access and liability. There is a need for the data subject to have its vehi-
cle and movement data protected for privacy reasons, and in the case of companies, for
competition and/or security reasons.
Data economy. Given all above, standardized access favors interoperability between different
applications and facilitates the common use of same vehicle data and resources [2, p. 7].
The exact in-vehicle data access and sharing solution that will be deployed within C-ITS will
be determined not only by technological availability but also as a result of negotiation between
multiple interest groups within the industry – vehicle manufacturers, component suppliers, re-
pair and maintenance, testing and certification, application service, IT service providers, road
authorities, vehicle rental and fleet operators and policy makers.
There are three main technical solutions currently negotiated among industry participants
and interest groups:
On-board application platform: internal in-vehicle operating system that supports installing
third-party applications which access to the data of the vehicle;
In-vehicle interface which provides an interface for applications (internal or external) to ac-
cess in-vehicle data;
Data server where all data is uploaded to the server outside a car which manages data access
to third parties and applications. Furthermore, three data server based solutions are
distinguished: extended vehicle, shared/neutral and B2B marketplace.
McCarthy et al. [9] provides the analysis of these candidate solutions in light of guiding
principles required by policy makers and preferences of industry interest groups (see Figure
10
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3) and concludes that the data server concept has the largest potential to be implemented in
C-ITS. This conclusion was made on the grounds of consideration that if policy makers will
not intervene into the market, vehicle manufacturers will implement their preferred solution,
which is data server. Considering (1) largely "wait and see" policy of the European Union
towards new technologies so that not to stifle innovation and (2) the short time-frame for first
C-ITS implementation in Europe, market intervention is very unlikely, therefore data server
architecture is the most probable.
(a) Compliance of different solutions to the five guiding
principles.
(b) Preferences of industry interest groups towards the
candidate in-vehicle data access solutions.
Figure 3: Analysis of proposed in-vehicle data access architecture for implementation in C-ITS sce-
narios. Green rectangles indicate the preferred solution by each interest group, shaded area in green –
the solution with strongest support. Adapted from [9].
Main lobbying and standards groups of automobile industry in European Union – European
Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA)28 and European Association of Automotive
Suppliers (CLEPA)29 have joined forces30 behind the proposal for a Data server / Extended ve-
hicle architecture for allowing access to vehicle data for third-party services and service providers
in C-ITS scenarios [3]. The gist is of the proposed architecture (Figure 4) is that data from
in-vehicle data recording and storage system (EDR-AD31/DSSA32) will be synchronized with
the proprietary vehicle manufacturer’s server, which will contain rules for managing authorized
services’, service providers’ and neutral server’s access to data. Neutral server will be provided
by a third party in a business-to-business (B2B) data marketplace. It will contain a rule engine
to send authorized data to specific service providers.
Within the scope of this paper we are mostly interested in the in-vehicle data recording and
storage device which will collect and store data of communications between vehicle’s ECUs and
external messages in C-ITS scenarios. Yet the device cannot be seen as an isolated unit – it will
be an integral part of proposed Extended Vehicle infrastructure (Figure 4)
28http://www.acea.be/
29https://clepa.eu/
30https://www.ereg-association.eu/news-items/acea-and-clepa-join-forces-to-find-a-solution-for-secure-and-
safe-access-to-vehicle-data/
31Event Data Recorder for Automated Driving (EDR-AD) – a term used in industry groups GEAR2030 working
documents.
32Data Storage Systems of Automatic Car Steering Function (DSSA)– a term used in UNECE working docu-
ments
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Figure 4: Neutral data server and B2B marketplace architecture for in-vehicle data access in C-ITS
supported by ACEA and CLEPA. The green shaded area indicates an in-vehicle data recording, storage
and access management implemented as Event Data Recorder for Autonomous Driving (EDR-AD) or
Data Storage System for Automatic Car Steering Function (DSSA).
3.2 Evolving technological landscape and regulatory directions
Modern cars are controlled by a large stack of distributed software that executes more than 50
interconnected Electronic Control Units (ECUs) [17, p. 1]. Autonomous vehicles may contain
hundreds of such nodes (data source, decision making, actuating, ect.), communications among
which will determine the functionality, automation level and behavior of a vehicle and constitute
what is called Controller Area Network (CAN). Operation of CAN is safety and mission critical,
involves large amount of messages per second and therefore should be designed with security and
anti-tampering considerations in mind. While recent standardization efforts address security, no
practical solutions are implemented in current cars [17, p. 1]. Considering drastically increasing
importance of in-vehicle communications networks in automated driving systems for overall
functionality of vehicles and their safety characteristics as well as dependency on out-vehicle
communications in C-ITS, there is a clear and urgent need to develop secure architectures of
CANs ready for C-ITS scenarios which not only preserve current status quo in automotive
security, but largely enhance it.
Results of state-of-the-art research in embedded and distributed systems security and pri-
vacy provide embedded protected module architectures with strong security guarantees having
application potential for efficient message authentication in vehicular communication networks.
For example, Sancus 2.0 low-cost security architecture for networked embedded IoT devices [11]
can remotely attest to a software provider that a specific module is running uncompromised and
can provide a secure communication channel between software modules and software providers.
It supports remote software installation on devices while maintaining strong security guarantees.
VulCAN – an efficient component authentication and software isolation for automotive control
networks based on Sancus architecture [17] – brings strong security to automotive computing by
featuring message authentication, strong software security and Trusted Computing – software
component isolation and cryptography leveraging hardware-level cryptographic primitives for
real-time efficiency of automotive networks. VulCAN architecture solves the problems inherent
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in current complex vehicle bus systems with many ECUs and gateways to other communication
systems that do not offer protection against message injection or replay attacks. Furthermore,
it provides efficient and cost-effective implementation of AUTOSAR (major industry standard-
ization partnership33 compliant CAN authentication protocols for future automotive networks.
These technologies are clear and ready candidates for developing CANs for automated vehicles
and C-ITS scenarios, notably vehicle data access systems – see Section 3.1.
All communications in C-ITS system could be categorized into in-vehicle data/messages
and out-vehicle data/messages by simple criteria of whether a message from an ECU leaves
the CAN of a vehicle. In terms of EU Data Privacy and Provenance policy there is a clear
separation between the two:
i. Out-vehicle data/messages (CAM or DENM) are considered personal data and therefore
fall under regulation of GDPR [1, p. 4] [14, p. 27], but the concrete legal basis for
processing such data under GDPR is not yet determined34.
ii. Additionally, the ePrivacy Regulation may become relevant for out-vehicle data/messages
as the second proposal of the Commission states that all machine to machine communica-
tions fall under its scope [1, p. 6].
iii. In-vehicle data/messages are exempt from GDPR on the grounds that it is considered
a processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of purely personal or
household activity35.
There is a clear direction for coming up with a legal framework for including data storage
requirements in the type-approval legislation of EU. As per recommendations of High Level
Group GEAR 2030, the European Commission should monitor and evaluate the need to revise
the Motor Insurance and Product Liability Directives as well as the need for additional EU legal
instruments to take into account future development of technologies [6]. The Commission will be
developing EU type-approval framework for the certification of automated vehicles, including
alternative assessment method and identification of work priorities at the UNECE, EU and
Member State levels in 2018.
The exact requirements for the information that will need to be stored by automated vehicles
are in the process of development, yet GEAR 2030 meeting documents include a final draft of
Discussion Paper on Event Data Recorders for Automated Driving (EDR-AD) of September
2016[4] which suggests that basically all sensor information as well as communications will have
to be recorded for at least limited period of time. It also describes that data should be collected
in the following nodes in automated vehicle: data source nodes (e.g. sensors), decision making
33AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture – https://www.autosar.org) is a worldwide develop-
ment partnership and industry standardization body of biggest automotive manufacturers, suppliers and other
interest groups. It pursues the objective of developing and establishing open standards for automotive electronic
control units (ECUs) instrumental for industry-wide efficiency of automotive network design.
34 Four possible legal bases or a combination of them are considered: public interests (art 6(1)e GDPR),
performance of a contract (art 6(1)b GDPR), consent (art 6(1)a GDPR) or legitimate interest (art 6(1)f GDPR).
Also, as ITS Directive 2010/40/EU allows the European Commission to adopt binding specifications in this field
via delegated acts, the mandatory deployment of C-ITS is also considered as an option, but not for the initial
deployment in 2019 [1, p. 5].
35 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the
course of a purely personal or household activity (art. 2(a) GDPR). This exemption may only be valid when
strictly limited to the processing that takes place inside a car, and only if the driver is in full control of the
processing within the device. It cannot be valid when the device installed in the cars forwards the data of other
nearby cars, be it immediately, or as a result of local processing. In such cases the processing is not limited to a
strictly personal activity [1, p. 9].
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nodes (e.g. neural network nodes which make decision in automated driving scenarios), actuating
system nodes (e.g. braking, throttle) and special data collection node (i.e. "black box"). Data
privacy is a key concern that will have to be addressed within the regulatory framework of Data
Privacy and Provenance Policy. Furthermore, the provisions for using cryptographic algorithm
for security and data tampering preventions are considered. [4] is the basis for data requirements
of EDR/AD system considered in the proposal for a solution (section 3.3).
Since requirements for EDR/AD systems allow certain data to leave an in-vehicle network,
it is only reasonable to assume that GDPR and ePrivacy regulations may apply as soon as this
happens, e.g. when the right of competent authorities to access the in-vehicle data recorded in
EDR/AD systems is exercised.
The specific ongoing standardization projects related to in-vehicle data access systems and,
consequently, EDR/AD devices are:
• Cyber-security regulations for Intelligent Transportation Systems and Automated Driving
(ITS/AD) by UNECE Working Party 29 (Section 2.3) are projected to be drafted in by
the end of first quarter of 2018 and finalized by the middle of 2018. All meeting documents
of the specific working group regarding these regulations are available on-line36;
• New standartization project by ISO for defining the Extended vehicle concept (Figure 4)
involves standards on methodology37, published in December 2017, ’web services’38, pub-
lished in January 2018 and remote diagnostic supportfootnoteISO/DIS 20080 Road vehi-
cles – Information for remote diagnostic support – General requirements, definitions and
use cases – https://www.iso.org/standard/66979.html, which is still in "enquiry" phase
(i.e. about a year from publishing).
• Specific regulations regarding inclusion of data recording and storage systems into type-
approval requirements (i.e. UN Regulation 79)39 are under discussion at UNECE’s Com-
mittee on Automatically Commanded Steering Function (ACSF)40 and expected to be
finalized and published in stages in 2018 and 2019;
• Finally, some EU member countries, notably Germany, has passed a law[16, p. 3]41 al-
lowing Level 3 automation level (see Figure 1a) on public roads as long as data recording
device to be defined by UNECE is installed42.
This indicates a clear consensus that the Event Data Recorder for Automated Driving will
be a regulatory prerequisite for Automated Driving in EU[4, p. 12] and is on a way to be defined
by 2019-2020 for the first implementation of C-ITS in Europe. Starting to develop the EDR/AD
devices already now (based on the available documentation, standards and working group docu-
ments and considering security, privacy and non-tamperability requirements) is instrumental for
successful implementation of the system and a business opportunity. We now turn to describe
a proposal for concrete in-vehicle data recording, storage and access management solution and
discuss the related specific aspects of regulatory framework and technology availabilities.
36https://wiki.unece.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=2523344
37ISO 20077-1:2017 Road Vehicles – Extended vehicle (ExVe) methodology – Part 1: General information –
https://www.iso.org/standard/66975.html
38ISO 20077-2:2018 Road Vehicles – Extended vehicle (ExVe) methodology – Part 2: Methodology for designing
the extended vehicle – https://www.iso.org/standard/67597.html
39http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/79(2)/oj
40https://wiki.unece.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=25265606
41http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2017/kw13-de-automatisiertes-fahren/499928
42https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-autos-self-driving/germany-adopts-self-driving-vehicles-law-
idUSKBN1881HY
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3.3 EDR/AD solution for connected autonomous vehicles
EDR/AD is a subsystem of a vehicular Controller Area Network which ensures the confidential-
ity, integrity and availability of data related to operation of a vehicle in order to permit recovery
of exact situation following the occurrence of an event (e.g. traffic accident or other incident)
or on demand. The discussion about EDR use is still going on in the world, but the need for
this technology will soon increase with the introduction of automated vehicles on the road. It
is still not clearly defined, how future accidents involving semi- of fully automated vehicles will
be investigated and judged, but it is clear that the technology for obtaining evidence about the
system’s state before or after an accident will be needed. The work at many levels of governance
(see Section 3.2) for standardizing the EDR/AD device is being done in order to clarify which
data will be recorded, how it will be accessed and by whom as well as how vehicle and C-ITS
will look like to guarantee data consistency.
Exact data recording requirements are still under discussion, yet it is reasonable to assume
that autonomous vehicles will be recording considerable part (if not all) of internal and external
communications, considering the availability of modern cheap storage technologies. Preliminary
discussions on nature of data that will be recorded as well as some projected particularities of
EDR/AD architecture at the time of writing can be inferred from working documents only[4].
Nevertheless, such uncertainty does not prevent to develop the system, since it will anyway have
to feature flexible on-demand reconfigurability of data sources, storage volumes and time, as
well as their access management and permissions, since the regulatory environment (now and
in the future) is too fluid for allowing such rigidity.
We describe the preliminary architecture of the EDR/AD system in terms of five processes
that it has to implement (see Figure 5).
Secure identification of data sources is needed for ensuring data integrity when the mes-
sages originated from different ECUs in an in-vehicular network will be stored and then
identified upon retrieval. Security is needed in order to prevent data tampering. Note, that
in C-ITS scenarios, data which can influence the behavior of a vehicle also includes CAM
messages received from other vehicles and road stations, correct and secure identification
of which may have a decisive role for event reconstruction.
Metadata enrichment is a process which adds additional semantic data to messages which
may be needed for further processing and retrieval. While the exact metadata requirements
are not clear at the moment of writing, it will include at least identifier and a timestamp,
and also category of a message for access rights management. In case a message leaves
an in-vehicular network it may also have to be enriched with the metadata about state of
user’s consent to share private information (i.e. consent marker) [13, p. 55].
Data exchange and messaging is obviously the process that allows the messages to be passed
between Electronic Control Units preserving their integrity, security and all metadata. For
the solution to be applicable for C-ITS scenarios, data exchange an messaging processes
should account for the possibility for some messages to be exchanged with out-vehicle
network.
Data recording &storage is the process which takes care of filtering messages that need to
be stored according to requirements, and recording them into storage on either dedicated
ECU (EDR-AD) or other nodes of the in-vehicle network.
Access management / privacy preserving querying is the process which allows for a com-
petent authority or a stakeholder of the ecosystem to access data which it is authorized
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to access, without compromising privacy of other stakeholders.
Note, that Extended Vehicle concept provides that data access management rules will be
defined and enforced by vehicle manufacturer’s or neutral server (Figure 4), therefore the archi-
tecture should be taken into account when designing EDR/AD device, which implies the need
for cooperation between all stakeholders for designing a it (vehicle manufacturers, component
suppliers, cryptography researchers and more).
Figure 5: A high level depiction of the components of the EDR/AD for C-ITS solution.
The five processes should ensure data security and reliability requirements, including, but
not limited to the following (based on [4, p. 14]):
• In terms of data confidentiality – allow to limit the access to authorized persons / insti-
tutions only (i.e. limit the access to EDR/AD ECU for the end user and encrypt the
stored data). Access management solutions will have to comply to C-ITS trust model and
certificate policy based on PKI [5];
• With regard to data integrity – protect the system from any modification and tampering
(e.g. pair the EDR with the vehicle and signed the stored data). There is a possibility to
leverage SANCUS security architecture for these purposes [10, 11].
• In terms of data availability – ensure data recording capability in case of event (e.g.
duplicating EDR ECU);
• The data securization format could depend on the data type, the storage support and
regulatory requirements of EU Data Privacy and Provenance Policy (Section 2.4);
From a general perspective, the five processes of EDR/AD solution require to leverage three
broad areas: (1) Security architecture for C-ITS, required for data exchange and messaging,
meta-data enrichment and secure identification of data sources (Figure 6); (2) Advanced access
management solutions, required by data recording & storage and privacy preserving queries
processes (Figure 7) (3) Global discover-ability solutions, also needed for data recording and
storage and privacy preserving querying processes (Figure 8).
3.3.1 Security architecture
Security architecture for the C-ITS is being actively developed by C-ITS Platform and GEAR2030
working groups and is the main pillar of collaborative intelligent transport systems of the future.
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It is the subject of C-ITS Certificate and Security policy and at the time of writing is being de-
scribed by two documents: (1) First release of Certificate Policy for Deployment and Operation
of European Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS), June 2017 [7] and (2) Opin-
ion of Article 29 Working Group on processing personal data in the context of Cooperative
Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS), October 4, 2017 [1].
Figure 6: Relations of security architecture for C-ITS and processes of proposed EDR/AD solution.
These documents are mostly concerned with the security and data privacy issues as related
to the CAM and DENM messages in V2V (vehicle to vehicle) and V2I (vehicle to infrastructure)
communications which are the key aspect of C-ITS functioning. Note, that the policy does not
explicitly address security of in-vehicle networks considering it a responsibility of automotive
manufacturers. Contrariwise, the proposed solution for EDR/AD for C-ITS integrates aspects
of in-vehicle security with the requirement to record and make available driving data as well as
C-ITS certificate policy as we believe that such integration is precisely what is needed for the
market.
The C-ITS security policy acknowledges that in many scenarios it is important to verify
the authenticity and integrity of the messages containing information such as position, velocity
and heading of a vehicle, also traffic control messages which are considered for later stages of
C-ITS deployment in Europe. The strong authenticity and integrity should allow to assess the
trustworthiness of the sent information. The actual identification of the sender of a message may
be needed in case of event (e.g. accident) reconstruction and judicial processes, yet the privacy
of road users should be maximized at the same time. The developed security architecture is
supported by Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) using commonly changing pseudonym certificates
[7, p. 13]. The proposed trust and governance model of PKI includes a number of Enrolment,
Authorization and Root Certificate Authorities of each Member State, governed by Trust List
Manager and authorized by EU level Certificate Authority. The certificate policy management,
PKI authorization management as well as authentication of the Trust List Manager will be a
responsibility of Policy Authority – a role composed by the representatives of public and private
stakeholders participating in C-ITS trust model. The policy will be binding for all participants
of trusted C-ITS system in Europe. Each vehicle will have to be authenticated within the system
at every moment of participation.
Since C-ITS security architecture will be based on PKI, it is only reasonable to design in-
vehicle data access solutions which integrate to the same infrastructure – i.e. use cryptographic
certificates and public/private key pairs for authentication and possibly decryption of encrypted
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data. Importantly, existing state of the art technologies for ensuring strict security of in-vehicle
and out-vehicle communications (e.g. Sancus, VulCAN or similar – see Section 3.2) should
be leveraged and integrated into the overall C-ITS data flows management architecture for
achieving guiding principles set forth by policy makers (Section 3.1).
Figure 7: Relations of advanced access management to the processes of proposed EDR/AD solution.
3.3.2 Access management
An agreement on access to data between all relevant public and private stakeholders should be
found, including business model-related question of national or European data licenses, formats,
interfaces and addressing privacy concerns [14, p. 15]. A technical solution for enabling secure
and privacy preserving access to data should be flexible and expendable for accommodating
changing requirements of such agreement.
In line with Extended Vehicle concept, access to in-vehicle data will be managed by an ex-
ternal server – either vehicle manufacturer’s or neutral provider’s. Yet, Extended Vehicle will
need to provide for at least two more channels of data access – (1) peer-to-peer ad-hoc commu-
nication with other vehicles, road-side units and traffic managers which is an essential aspect of
C-ITS operation; (2) off-line access via ODB (On-board diagnostics) or ODB II connectors for
technical inspection and repair (see Figure 4). In order to keep data integrity, all three access
points to in-vehicle data – external server, ad hoc communication and ODB ports – will have to
by integrated via EDB/AD subsystem of vehicular CAN. This is especially relevant to ad-hoc
communications as it is the basis for C-ITS. Therefore, Extended Vehicle concept and archi-
tecture does not cover all in-vehicle data access issues. Most importantly, it does not provide
solutions to the data security and authenticity aspects of C-ITS.
3.3.3 Global discover-ability
The requirement of global discover-ability is the least obvious in the proposed solution and may
not be needed for the use cases of the first deployment of C-ITS. Yet it is still included into the
solution because it should be explicitly addressed during the design and may be needed for the
use cases beyond first deployment (e.g. using cameras and sensors of different vehicles or road-
side units). Global discover-ability implies two functionalities: (1) as soon as the data leaves
an in-vehicle network, it will have to be uniquely identified and related to a vehicle (via PKI
or pseudonym certificates) in order to ensure certain aspects of Data Privacy and Provenance
policy (e.g. right to be forgotten principle); (2) in C-ITS use cases where a vehicle will rely
on information received from another vehicles or roadside equipment or even will use their
sensors remotely, a system of devices broadcasting the information about their capabilities and
availability to share information.
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Figure 8: Relations of global discover-ability to processes of proposed EDR/AD solution.
4 Conclusion
The transport sector is in the process of being rapidly and fundamentally reshaped by new
emerging technologies, including autonomous driving and collective intelligent transportation
systems. This reshaping promises huge economic and social benefits yet brings equally huge
challenges in terms of secure and safe technology development, its smooth integration to social
fabric and the adaptation of legal and regulatory framework. In the previous article we have
developed Policy Scan and Technology Strategy Design methodology [18] for identification of
concrete societal expectations and problems and technological availabilities that can mitigate
them in the domain of autonomous driving and smart mobility. As a result we have identified
technology having a clear place in emerging technological and regulatory landscape as well as
market deployment potential – Event Data Recorder for Autonomous Driving (EDR/AD).
In this article, particularities of the context of EDR/AD related technology availabilities,
regulatory initiatives and problematics of the large scale industry transition at European and
international level are presented and discussed in depth. EDR/AD is one of the technological
solutions which, if designed by integrating knowledge existing in the industry and academia, can
help to design a robust and secure in-vehicle data recording, storage and access management
solutions which will be a regulatory prerequisite for the deployment of autonomous vehicles.
Transformation of transport sector involves many stakeholders and interest groups and it is
important to understand that no one of them has a decisive power to shape the direction of
the transformation (albeit some of them have more power than others). Guided by Policy Scan
and Technology Strategy design methodology [18] we explicate ecosystem of actors (industry
participants, policy makers, technology availabilities and more) around EDR/AD solution and
its place in the C-ITS. The aim of this explication is to pave ground for collaboration of relevant
stakeholders for developing and implementing concrete technology of EDR/AD, considering its
short and long term effects on the transformation of smart mobility systems, regulatory aspects
and business opportunities.
Further steps for developing EDR/AD as envisioned in this paper involves building collabo-
ration between vehicle manufacturers and security researchers in order to bring state of the art
security technologies to the industry, proposing concrete use cases for prototyping and security
analysis and developing a proof of concept demonstrator of technology that is market-deployment
ready. Considering the fast pace of automated driving technology development, plans to deploy
collaborative intelligent transportation systems in the short term and serious shortcomings in
security and non-tamperability of current vehicular networks, we conclude that development of
EDR/AD is an urgent need for industry.
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